# THALES


Managing Encryption Keys in Multi-cloud to Secure Your Cloud Assets

#### **Wood Lam**

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# Year 2020 - Beginning of the New Normal













# Is Maintaining Security in the Cloud so Difficult?

#### Lesson learnt from new normal

- > Think proactively
  - Multi-cloud strategy?
  - What goal do I want to achieve?

#### Avoid human error

- > Automation
- Compliance thinking
  - ➤ Control and logs

### Secured by design

- > Leverage cloud service provider
- ➤ Data security






# **Encryption and Encryption Keys**

Encryption protect the cloud data

But how to control the encryption key?



# Cloud Services and Key Management Systems





## Industry Standard on Cloud Key Management



#### Cloud Controls Matrix v4

Release Date: 01/20/2021

# CEK-08 [CSC Key Management Capability]

"CSPs must provide the capability for CSCs to manage their own data encryption keys."

CEK-10 Key Generation  CEK-11 Key Purpose  CEK-12 Key Rotation  CEK-13 Key Revocation  CEK-14 Key Destruction  CEK-15 Key Activation  CEK-16 Key Suspension  CEK-17 Key Deactivation  CEK-18 Key Archival  CEK-19 Key Compromise  CEK-20 Key Recovery		
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CEK-19 Key Compromise	CEK-17	Key Deactivation
	<b>CEK-18</b>	Key Archival
CEK-20 Key Recovery	CEK-19	Key Compromise
	CEK-20	Key Recovery

#### **CEK-09**

[Encryption and Key Management Audit]

Audit encryption and key management systems, policies, and processes



#### Office of the Government Chief Information Officer

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China

#### Practice Guide for Cloud Computing Security

- provides the practical guidance and reference for the secure adoption of cloud computing technology in the Government.

#### 5.4 Asset Management - [Protect data by encryption]

Data encryption is a way to enhance data confidentiality. B/Ds should confirm that encryption capabilities provided on cloud service are adequate with the cryptographic policy on the use of cryptographic controls. ... The **encryption key should also be properly protected and managed**.

#### 5.6 Cryptography - [Manage and protect cryptographic keys]

Cryptographic keys should be <u>managed</u> and <u>protected</u> properly in accordance with security regulations and policies. Key management on storage should be enforced and <u>keys should be managed in the custody of the B/Ds</u>. Processes for a <u>key management lifecycle</u> should be defined: how keys are generated, used, stored, backed up, recovered, rotated, and deleted... B/Ds may adopt encryption to protect unclassified information when using public cloud service with <u>cryptographic keys management</u> and protection.

#### 5.9.2 Virtualisation Security - [Enforce least privilege and segregation of duties]

Administrators of cloud, hypervisor, storage, network and system should perform their own duties without being able to gain access to the sensitive data residing on the systems they manage.

### BYOK, Key lifecycle management and challenges


- Different clouds with different security procedures
  - >Hard to realise Multi-cloud deployment?

Risk concerns during the BYOK procedures

Key lifecycle management



### BYOK vs Key Lifecycle Management and Centralized Key Management







# Use case 1 - Multinational energy corporation (Americas/US)

### Background

- The corporation had been heavily consuming cloud for the daily operations and workloads
- Multiple cloud native KMSs

### **Business challenges**

- Company IT Security mandated that all keys to be controlled and generated on-premises.
- > For key rotation, it took several hours to rotate keys with native tools.
- Audit challenges

### How Thales help

- > Several hours vs few minutes
- > Add-on automation, schedule and auditable logs
- Key recovery mechanism



# Use case 2 – Retail industry (APAC)

### Background

- The company wishes to migrate to SaaS provided by different CSPs
- > Highly concerned of the security of the business secret

### **Business challenges**

- Management concern about the cloud exit plan
- Lack of experts on multi-cloud operations and key management
- Market ready products

### How Thales help

- > BYOK with Key lifecycle management on multi-clouds
- Ready to support for different clouds and strong references
- > Fulfill cloud exit plans




#### Demo

Demo 1 – Managing Multiple KMSs

Demo 2 – Multiple Cloud Key Management



# Demo 1 – Managing Multiple Key Vaults (Before)




## **Difficulties**

- ➤ More Key Vaults, Harder for management
- > Limited key lifecycle management
- > Human errors



# Demo 1 – Managing Multiple Key Vaults (After)




### Improvement!


- > Centralized manage for multiple Key Vaults
- > Full key lifecycle management from on-premise to cloud
- > Automation with audit trails



# Demo 1 – Key Lifecycle Management



# Demo 2 – Multiple Cloud Key Management (Before)




#### **Difficulties**

- ➤ Learning curves and different operation procedures
- Different portals for different cloud
- ➤ Human error during different KMS BYOK




# Demo 2 – Multiple Cloud Key Management (After)

> Few clicks and automation for different cloud BYOK





# Demo 2 – Multi-Cloud Security Operation / Management



# Conclusion – Operation, Control and Compliance

#### Secured by design

Hard to manage and difficult on security standards and operations for multi-cloud

Design operation flow aligning multi-cloud

#### **Avoid human error**

Manual and different (and difficult) procedures for different clouds, highly potential causing human errors

Easy and automated, reduce human error risks



#### **Attaining compliance**

Audit trail missing for the manual key lifecycle procedures

Audit trail for whole key lifecycle



### Scan to Redeem

### Answer FOUR simple questions to receive a KeySmart









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